The assault on Hamas in Gaza that began this week has rocked that organization back on its heels and sent a powerful message to others around the Middle East and the world: Israel has learned the tactical lessons of the Second Lebanon War of 2006.  To be sure, the operation is still in its early stages and much can go wrong along the way, as is the case in any military campaign, but the indicators so far clearly indicate that the IDF and the government have taken those lessons to heart.  It is less clear that the strategic lessons have been learned as well.

High scores in tactics go to the intelligence services, the IAF and its targeting capabilities, and to the government.  The attack began with a series of deceptions, from permitting humanitarian goods into Gaza on Friday through declaring that the final decision would be made on Sunday.  This time, instead of hitting empty buildings in the idle of the night, the air attacks began late Saturday morning, a regular workday in the Muslim world, catching Hamas off guard with its institutions teeming with activity.  The results were stark and immediate hundreds of Hamas terrorists killed and wounded, with a minimum of non-combatant casualties.
 
IAF precision bombing, while certainly evident in Lebanon n 2006, was enhanced by close coordination with intelligence, providing the air force with high quality targets.  While some were obvious choices and easily marked, like headquarters buildings and training camps, the air strike that destroyed 40 tunnels in 4 minutes could only have been the fruit of Hollywood-style spy-craft.
 
Although the air operation has been successful, it is clear, as was the case in Lebanon, that air attacks alone cannot achieve the desired results of crippling Hamas’ rocket launching capabilities.  This objective can only be achieved by a ground operation, and the IDF has moved a large force to the Gaza area for just this purpose, as well as calling up a limited number of reserves.  Having trained for this scenario since the end of the Lebanon war, the IDF is as prepared as can be for this operation.  Now it remains to the government to give the order to advance.
 
Strategically, the government seems to have made the same mistakes that were made in 2006: failing to link the battlefield operations to a clear path to achieve its stated objectives.  A short term weakening Hamas has certainly been achieved, but if the campaign ends with rockets landing in Beersheba and Gedera, the terrorist organization can reasonably claim victory.  Given that it has stood alone against the might of the IDF, it may well emerge strengthened in the long run.  The fact that the government is even considering a cease fire, (48 hours, unilateral, and for humanitarian reasons), stating that if Hamas stops shooting, so will we, clearly indicates that the Israeli leadership has no strategic concept of why it went to war.
 
Hamas has responded as expected, recovering quickly after the shock of the initial air strikes, and firing more rockets at deeper targets in Israel.  Following Hizbullah’s successful 2006 playbook, Hamas aims to show by intensifying its rocket barrages, that it has not been vanquished so that any cease fire will appear as if Israel has quit under the pressure of the rocket attacks, a for fear of the consequences of the ground operation that it has threatened to launch.  Israel will emerge from this scenario as a paper tiger, and Hamas as heroic fighters who strikes fear in the hearts of the Zionist enemy.
 
Meanwhile, in the north, Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah is now caught on the horns of a dilemma.  Witnessing the drubbing his Sunni ally in Gaza is taking from the IDF, he has little inclination to subject his fighters to a similar fate.  Conversely, after years of taunting Israel and prodding Hamas to do the same, he risks scorn and ridicule from his terrorist allies if he decides to stay safely on the sidelines.  Stay tuned…

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