Unconventional Wisdom

 
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Hamas Perspectives and Options

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The old adage that one can plan how to begin a war but where it ends, nobody knows, is particularly pertinent to Hamas.  Khaled Mashal who heads the organization's political office in Damascus was in Cairo this week to begin arranging a cease-fire with Israel.  He is reported to have remarked that Hamas' shelling of Israel from the end of the tahadiya (calm) on Dec. 19 until the Israeli aerial bombardment on the 27th was only meant to pressure Israel into accepting Hamas demands – in particular concerning the crossing points, but were not meant to bring about a full scale conflict.

Certainly one can doubt his claim.  To end the blockade and obtain access to the outside world Hamas only needed to stop all rocket fire and the crossings would be opened under the international and Israeli supervision agreed upon with the Palestinian Authority.  To start gaining legitimacy and get off terror lists in Europe and North America further opportunities included allowing back the PA security forces and administration so brutally expelled during the Gaza civil war of June 2007 and the facilitation of the exchange of prisoners - Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit for hundreds of Hamas militants/terrorists.  Furthermore, the declaration and implementation of an economic development program in conjunction with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) and Fatah would go a long way in securing Western and other international financing for industry and modern port facilities in Gaza City.  Instead Hamas chose a "limited conflict" which veered out of control after hundreds of rockets were dropped on Israel over a two week period (begun even before the tahadiya was over).

But despite all, Hamas can only be forced from power by the Palestinian people themselves.  Too many in the West interpret such an analysis to mean they cannot be defeated on the battlefield through destruction of their weaponry, military/civilian command infrastructure and targeted removals of their leadership.  Hamas can be defeated and discredited but the Palestinians themselves are the final decision makers as to whether they are removed from power.  Hamas and aligned Islamic groups swept to a landslide victory in Jan. 2006 commanding 76 of 132 deputies in the Palestinian Legislature.  This exactly a year after Fatah's Abbas won the presidency. It was a form of co-habitation with the presidency in the hands of the secularists while the government was approved by an Islamist dominated legislature.  

Hamas stood at the crossroads of ensuring Palestinian unity and a better future for their people or continuing the "armed struggle".  They chose the latter, first in the armed expulsion of Fatah and then in the initiated war against Israel.  But the fact must be faced that Hamas was elected democratically.  The Palestinian People know the Hamas covenant, are familiar with the demands for a never ending war against Israel and secularism in the Moslem world and must take responsibility for their own actions.  It is often stated that "Peoples get the leadership they deserve."  Hopefully the Palestinians will decide that they deserve better.

Hamas knew an Israeli reaction would be elicited eventually, enough provocation and Israel has no choice but to respond.  And so it was.  The calculation of the Arab/Moslem world coming to their aid proved faulty as even Hezbollah's Hassan Nasrallah would much rather make bellicose statements than risk a war with Israel (over whom he claimed victory in 2006).

Three years later and Hamas stands at another crossroads.  Despite the unfortunate numbers of civilian casualties and world sympathy for the Palestinians in Gaza, Hamas is still considered a terror organization by most in the West and at the moment is losing credibility as a fighting force despite claiming Gaza would become a graveyard for the Israeli army.  The Strip is cut in half, Israeli forces are battling on the outskirts of the Palestinian cities (Gaza City, Deir el-Balah, Khan Yunis and Rafiah) and the Hamas leadership has disappeared underground for fear of being targeted by the Israeli air force.  According to unconfirmed reports hundreds of Hamas terrorists have been killed or wounded, 150 taken prisoner and the military leadership rendered partially ineffective through targeted removals.  Gaza is literally booby-trapped and honeycombed with underground bunkers full of ammunition and weapons stores, almost all in civilian areas.  Although the civilian population will never say so out loud, they cannot view such actions in a positive light.  After all, a fair amount of targets hit by Israel are being provided by Palestinians living in Gaza who want Hamas driven from their midst.

It is reported that the main Hamas force has withdrawn into the cities in the hope of drawing Israeli forces into house to house urban combat.  This not only imposes heavy casualties on the IDF but will increase world sympathies for the Palestinian civilians caught in the crossfire and by extension, Hamas itself.  Palestinian civilian casualties definitely work to the advantage of Hamas.  Israel's operation could end earlier than expected should non-combatant casualties sky rocket in urban conflict.  Besides doing great physical damage to the Hamas fighting force Israel needs to destroy as many arms/weapons caches and bunkers as possible (yes, some are in private homes, public buildings and mosques) and in particular the 500 – 600 tunnels between Egyptian Sinai and Gaza's Rafiah.

The Hamas leadership may already be looking to the aftermath of the conflict.  They can decide to continue adhering to the letter of their covenant and press on with World Jihad or they can emphasize the political arena and work through the apparatus of the PA and Palestinian Legislature.  Politically they can remain a religious party without a military wing and be elected to rule over a Palestinian State.  The organization can civilianize, agree to a two-state solution and mutual recognition of legitimacy and "right to exist" with Israel, thereby putting an end to the conflict.

In the short term none should expect Hamas to be voted out of power.  Surveying the damage in the aftermath of Israel's "Cast Lead" operation Hamas will need to decide on war or peace but will pursue neither.  Rather one can expect continued bellicose statements and declarations of loyalty to their covenant during an uneasy cease-fire.  Ironically the more power projected by Hamas at the end of the conflict, the more effective the cessation of hostilities will be enforced.  One thing is for sure, the Iranians and Hezbollah abandoned them and they need the hated Mubarak regime in Egypt, King Abdullah II of Jordan and even the PA Pres. Abbas of Fatah if they are to rehabilitate themselves.
Last Updated ( Saturday, 10 January 2009 21:08 )